BRAND-NAME DRUG MANUFACTURERS RISK ANTITRUST
VIOLATIONS BY SLOWING GENERIC PRODUCTION
THROUGH PATENT LAYERING
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INTRODUCTION
Patents on many blockbuster drugs will expire in the near
1
future, opening up the doorways for generic production. Brandname drug companies lose an estimated half of their U.S. sales
2
during the first six months of generic production alone. In an effort
to forestall large sales declines, some brand-name pharmaceutical
companies are scrambling to delay generic production.
One
measure brand-name pharmaceutical companies often take to extend
their monopolies is patenting additional features of the drug
3
products or purified forms of the drugs.
A patent gives a
pharmaceutical company the exclusive right to make, use, or sell the
4
patented drug for twenty years. When the patent expires generic
companies are free to market the same drug, creating competition in
the marketplace and lowering prices.
Although antitrust law prohibits anti-competitive behavior,
5
patents are an exception to the rule against monopolies. Patent
holders are given a legally enforceable monopoly for the twenty-year
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National Institute for Health Care Management Issue Brief, Prescription Drugs
and Intellectual Property Protection, available at http://www.nihcm.org (Aug. 2000) (on
file with the author) [hereinafter NIHCM Issue Brief].
2
Gardiner Harris & Chris Adams, Drug Manufacturers Step Up Legal Attacks That
Slow Generics, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2001, at A1.
3
See infra PART IV for further discussion.
4
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994).
5
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177
(1965) (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 816 (1945)). Patents provide great public benefits by encouraging investment
in innovation, but patents also provide antitrust concerns. David A. Balto,
Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Antitrust Risks, 55 FOOD DRUG L.J. 321, 327
(2000).

479

480

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33:479

6

life of the patent. A patent holder, however, may violate antitrust
laws when the patent is used to obtain increased market power
7
beyond that intended by Congress. Despite the perceived conflict
between patent and antirust law, the two areas are truly
8
Both are directed towards the promotion of
complementary.
9
innovation, enterprise, and competition. Patents provide incentives
for pharmaceutical companies to create new drugs because the
absence of competition during the patent period allows
10
pharmaceutical companies to charge high prices.
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) recently took action
against a series of agreements between brand-name pharmaceutical
companies and generic manufacturers that sought to use the Hatch11
Waxman Act 180-day exclusivity provision to block the entrance of
12
other generic manufacturers into the market.
Generic
6

Melissa K. Davis, Note and Comment, Monopolistic Tendencies of Brand-Name
Drug Companies In the Pharmaceutical Industry, 15 J.L. & COM. 357, 361-62 (1995).
7
DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
1111 (2d ed. 2001).
8
Anne K. Bingaman, Address at the Federal Circuit Judicial Conference
(transcript), available at http: //www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeeches/94-06-16.txt
(July 15, 1994) (on file with the author).
9
Id.
10
ABC NEWS: Bitter Medicine: Pills, Profits and the Public Health, ABC TELEVISION
BROAD., May 29, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, Transcripts File [hereinafter Bitter
Medicine].
11
35 U.S.C. § 156 (2002).
12
James Langenfeld, Antitrust: New Economy, New Regime Second Annual Symposium
of the American Antitrust Institute: Intellectual Property And Antitrust: Steps Toward Striking
A Balance, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91, 105 (2001). The FTC recently challenged
three agreements between brand-name pharmaceutical companies and generic drug
manufacturers where the brand-name company paid the generic manufacturer to
delay entry into the market. The Federal Trade Commission, Prepared Statement Before
the Committee On the Judiciary United States Senate, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2001/05/pharmtstmy.htm (May 24, 2001) (on file with the author).
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic manufacturers are given incentive to
challenge a patent holder by awarding the first generic manufacturer to submit an
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), a 180-day exclusivity period whereby it
is protected from competition by subsequent generic applicants. 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (1994). The period does not begin until either the generic
manufacturer markets the drug, or when a court renders a decision holding the
patent invalid or not infringed. Id. Thus, if a brand-name company and the first
generic company to file an ANDA settle a patent dispute and enter into an
agreement to forestall generic production, other generic manufacturers are
prevented from marketing their generic versions indefinitely. The Federal Trade
Commission, Prepared Statement Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation United States Senate, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/04/pharm
testimony.htm#N_39_ (April 23, 2002) (on file with the author). The Greater Access
to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act (GAAP), however, which was passed in the Senate
on July 31, 2002, would amend the Hatch-Waxman Act so that generic and brand-
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manufacturers, Congress, and the public have accused brand-name
pharmaceutical companies of attempting to forestall generics from
entering the market by filing frivolous drug patents, a practice the
13
FTC has recently begun to review.
The pharmaceutical industry is the most profitable industry in
the country, with the top ten companies earning more than thirty14
seven billion dollars in profits in 2001. Although pharmaceutical
companies’ earnings are high, one study indicates that it costs an
average of eight hundred million dollars to get one new drug to the
15
market.
Thus, it is not difficult to see why pharmaceutical
companies want to hold on to their monopolies on profit-producing
drugs.
This Comment examines patent prosecution tactics used by
brand-name pharmaceutical corporations to extend their drug
monopolies and discusses whether these tactics rise to the level of
antitrust violations. Part I provides an overview of patent law in the
pharmaceutical industry and the role of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Part
II provides a general overview of antitrust law. Part III describes the
patent prosecution tactics used by some brand-name pharmaceutical
companies to extend their monopolies. Specifically, Part III.A
16
describes the approach of patenting metabolites created by the

name companies that enter into agreements to keep the generics off the market, will
not prohibit other generic companies from marketing the drug. S. Res. 812, 107th
Cong. (2002) (enacted). One of the Act’s purposes is “to ensure fair marketplace
practices and deter pharmaceutical companies (including generic companies) from
engaging in anticompetitive action or actions that tend to unfairly restrain trade.”
Id.
13
In February 2001, the FTC announced its intention to collect information
about brand-name pharmaceutical companies’ orange book listings to investigate
generic competition development under the Hatch-Waxman Act. Federal Trade
Commission Agency Information Collection Activities; Submission for OMB Review;
Comment Request, 66 Fed. Reg. 12512 (Feb. 27, 2001). To date no action has been
taken against the pharmaceutical industry for frivolous patent listings. Id. This study
will provide the FTC with information about “concerns that manufacturers of
pioneer drugs are listing additional patents shortly before the expiration of
previously listed patents . . . .” The Federal Trade Commission, Prepared Statement
Before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2001/05/pharmtstmy.htm (May 24, 2001) (on file with the author).
14
Bitter Medicine, supra note 10.
15
Id. Tufts University found that it costs $800 million in drug development to
get one new drug on the market. Id. However, pharmaceutical industry critics argue
that the drug companies have yet to reveal any detailed reports of their research
costs and that this number is used by the pharmaceutical industry for political
purposes. Id.
16
Metabolites are molecules that are formed in the body from the breakdown of
an ingested drug. Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (2001).
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breakdown of a drug in the body. Part III.B explains the approach
18
of double patenting drugs. Part III.C describes the approach of
19
patenting polymorphic forms of already patented drugs.
This Comment concludes that brand-name pharmaceutical
companies are likely to be immune from Sherman Act Section 2
claims under the Noerr-Immunity doctrine, even if their intent was to
20
extend the scope of their monopolies through patent evergreening.
This Comment recommends both legislative changes to the HatchWaxman Act and the institution of guidelines for listing a patent in
21
the Orange Book.
This Comment calls for review of both the
22
protection the Federal Circuit gives patent holders and the Patent
and Trademark Office’s procedures.
I. PATENT LAW IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND THE HATCHWAXMAN ACT
For the past twenty years, the pharmaceutical industry has been
the most lucrative industry in the United States, due in part to its
power to control prices derived from intellectual property
23
protection. Prescription drug sales have increased dramatically in
24
recent years. In 2000, prescription drug expenditures in the United
States were over $130 billion, representing an almost twenty percent

17

The patenting of metabolites is one method that has been used by some
pharmaceutical companies to extend the lives of their exclusivity periods. Id.
18
The practice of double patenting involves obtaining multiple patents on one
single compound where the two patents are not distinct. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs.,
Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 967 (2001).
19
Some drug compounds exist in multiple forms called polymorphs.
Pharmaceutical companies have been successful in patenting different polymorphic
forms of certain drugs. See Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562 (1997).
20
Evergreening is the strategy of obtaining additional patents on specific features
of a drug product or a purified form of the drug to extend the monopoly on a drug
when the patent is close to expiration. NIHCM Issue Brief, supra note 1.
21
The Orange Book, or the Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic
Equivalence Evaluations, lists all FDA approved drugs and their related patents. See
21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994).
22
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) was created in 1982 as a
forum for patent appeals to reduce patent litigation forum shopping. CHISUM ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 24-25. The court has exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals set
forth under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1994). Id. at 25. The court consists of twelve
circuit judges. Id. at 26.
23
NIHCM Issue Brief, supra note 1.
24
National Institute for Health Care Management Research and Educational
Foundation, Prescription Drug Expenditures In 2000: The Upward Trend Continues (2000),
available at http://www.nihcm.org (last visited Nov. 1, 2002) (on file with the
author).
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25

increase from 1999. In light of this rapid rise in prescription drug
expenditures, there is renewed public attention on patent laws, drug
regulations, and the tactics employed by brand-name drug companies
26
to forestall generic drug entry into the market.
The United States Constitution Article I, Section 8, Clause 8
27
authorizes Congress to grant patents. A patent provides a monopoly
in an invention for a limited period of time, including the exclusive
28
rights to make, use, and sell the invention. Thus, patents are an
29
exception to the rule against monopolies and to the right to a free
30
and open market. A United States patentee receives a patent for
31
Once granted, a patent
twenty years from the date of filing.
provides the patent holder with the right to exclude others from
32
using the invention. Anyone who “without authority makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention within the United States
or imports into the United States any patented invention during the
33
term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”
Patents provide great incentive for brand-name pharmaceutical
companies to conduct research because patent rights eliminate
competition during the patent period, enabling patent holders to
34
charge a premium for their drugs. Because of the high costs of
research and development, the pharmaceutical industry views patents
35
as an especially important form of motivation.
Thus, it is
advantageous for a pharmaceutical company to obtain as many
25

Id.
Id.
27
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have the power . . . to promote
the progress of science and useful arts by securing for times to authors and inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”). The Supreme
Court explained the purpose of patents as public franchises given to inventors as
compensation for their time and expense in creating new and useful improvements
for the benefit of the public. Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 533 (1870).
28
Davis, supra note 6, at 361-62.
29
Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act provides that “every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony.” 15
U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
30
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177
(1965) (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 816 (1945)).
31
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994). The patent gives its owner a monopoly on the
invention that expires twenty years from the date of the patent application. Id.
32
Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378 (1945).
33
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
34
See NIHCM, supra note 1.
35
Evan Ackiron, The Human Genome Initiative and the Impact of Genetic Testing and
Screening Technologies: Note and Comment: Patents for Critical Pharmaceuticals: The AZT
Case, 17 AM. J.L. MED. 145, 149 (1991).
26
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patents as possible. Patent holders can obtain numerous patents on a
single drug including: formulation, composition, methods of
36
manufacture, and method of use patents.
A patent holder may
increase the term of its monopoly by filing additional patents at a
37
time later than the original filing.
To obtain a patent, the inventor must file an application with the
38
Patent Office. The applicant must claim that the invention is novel,
39
useful, and nonobvious. Although the patent process is ex parte, a
40
patent has a presumption of validity. As a protection, applicants
have the duty of absolute candor to the Patent Office and must
41
disclose all material information.
Absolute candor requires,
however, only that applicants provide the Patent Office with prior
42
43
art of which they have knowledge. There is no affirmative duty to
44
research and supply additional information.
Further, reviews of
36

Terry G. Mahn, Symposium Issue - Striking The Right Balance Between Innovation
And Drug Price Competition: Understanding The Hatch-Waxman Act: The Hatch-Waxman
Act During Patent Prosecution and Beyond, 54 FOOD DRUG L.J. 233, 234 (1999).
37
See id. “If there are multiple NCEs [new chemical entities] developed during
the drug development stage, the patent strategy should be to file for separate patents
for each NCE.” Id. at 234. New chemical entities include isomers, crystalline forms,
metabolites, and polymorphs. Id.
38
35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988). The Patent Office has the power to grant patents
pursuant to the Patent Act. Id. The Patent Office is officially known as the Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO).
39
35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1988).
40
35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988). The only participants in patent prosecution are the
applicant and the patent examiner. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent
Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1499 (2001).
41
35 U.S.C. § 115 (1988).
42
“Prior art is the set of circumstances set forth in [35 U.S.C. §102] AND
NOTHING MORE. Prior art may be an act—an offer for sale, a use, and a prior
invention – or it may be a document—a prior foreign patent or publication, or it may
be a U.S. patent.” PLI’S EXAM FOCUS PATENT BAR REVIEW, STUDY GUIDE (2002)
(emphasis in original). 35 U.S.C. section 103 provides that “[a] patent may not be
obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in
section 102 of this title if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in
the art . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 103. Section 102 (a), (e), and (g) are the prior art
subsections. Application of Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1290 (1973). Section 102 provides
that “[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless-(a) the invention was known . . .
by others . . . or described in a printed publication . . . before the invention by the
applicant, or (e) the invention was described in- (1) an application for patent, or (2)
a patent granted on an application for patent” or (g) another inventor establishes
that the invention was made by the other inventor. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
43
Lemley, supra note 40, at 1499-1500. The examiner has the responsibility of
reviewing the application and researching the prior art to decide whether the claims
in the patent application should be rejected. Id.
44
Id.
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45

patent applications are not extensive. The examiner only spends an
average total of eighteen hours over the course of the two to three
46
year prosecution of each application. As such, examiners often
47
overlook the most relevant prior art. The result is that many of the
48
patents issued would have been rejected if given greater review.
Further, a large percentage of patents that are eventually litigated to
49
judgment are invalidated.
Pharmaceutical research typically involves years of experiments
in human cell models and in animals prior to human
50
experimentation. If this extensive preclinical research is successful,
the company files an Investigational New Drug application (“IND”)
with the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) requesting approval
51
to initiate human experiments.
Pharmaceutical companies
52
generally file patents during preclinical testing of the drug, prior to
53
the filing of an IND with the FDA. If the company deems a drug to
be safe and efficacious after clinical trials, a New Drug Application
54
(NDA) is filed with the FDA requesting approval to market the drug.
The NDA must contain the drug’s safety and effectiveness data,
information on the manufacturing process; and information on
55
packaging, labeling and marketing of the drug. The NDA must also
include a list of all the patents covering the pioneer drug that might
be infringed if a generic drug was marketed prior to the patent

45

Id. at 1500.
Id.
47
Id. at 1528.
48
Lemley, supra note 40, at 1528. A more comprehensive examination process
might deter the filing of some frivolous applications because of the increased
likelihood that it would be rejected. Id. at 1508.
49
John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N Q.J. 185, 205 (1998).
50
William M. Brown, A “Highly Artificial Act of Infringement,” Indeed, But It Can Still
Cost You Attorneys’ Fees . . . Comment on Yamanouchi v. Danbury, 33 UWLA L. REV. 117,
124 (2001).
51
Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Symposium Issue - Striking The Right Balance Between
Innovation And Drug Price Competition: Understanding the Hatch-Waxman Act: Overview of
the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD DRUG L.J.
187, 192 (1999).
52
Preclinical testing involves assessing a drug’s potential utility in animal models
and in vitro assays. Brown, supra note 50, at 125. If the drug is determined to be safe
and efficacious during preclinical testing the drug is then tested in humans. Id.
Testing in humans is called clinical trials. Id. If testing in humans shows the drug is
safe and efficacious, a new drug application is made to the FDA. Id.
53
Mossinghoff, supra note 51, at 192.
54
Brown, supra note 50, at 125.
55
21 U.S.C. § 355(b), (c)(2) (1994).
46
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56

expiration. If the FDA approves the NDA, all the patents on the
drug that are listed in the NDA will be published in the Approved
Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, also known
57
as the Orange Book.
The FDA does not make an independent
determination as to whether the patents listed in the NDA actually
cover the pioneer drug, but instead relies on a signed declaration
58
from the applicant.
Generally, the patent is issued years before FDA approval of the
59
drug. However, under the Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
also known as the Hatch- Waxman Act Amendments to the Federal
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, the patent holder can apply for an
extension on the patent term to regain time that was lost in
60
regulatory review of the drug.
Generic companies duplicate pioneer prescription drugs by
using the same active ingredients found in the pioneer drugs but with
61
different inactive ingredients. The Hatch-Waxman Act governs FDA
62
63
approval of generic drugs. If the generic drug is the bioequivalent
56

Brown, supra note 50, at 125.
21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (1994). The Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic
Equivalence Evaluations is commonly known as the Orange Book. It lists all FDA
approved drugs and their related patents. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7)(A)(iii) (1994). The
FDA obtains this information from the NDA applicant. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)
(1994).
58
Brown, supra note 50, at 125-26. The FDA lists almost any patent submitted
with the NDA in the Orange Book. It avoids patent disputes and does not change
the listings in the Orange Book for patents in dispute. 21 C.F.R. § 314 (1994).
59
Mossinghoff, supra note 51, at 192.
60
35 U.S.C. § 156 (1984) [hereinafter the Hatch-Waxman Act or “the Act”].
61
United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453, 454-55 (1983).
62
21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(2)(A)(vii) (1994).
63
Bioequivalence is defined as “the absence of significant difference in the rate
and extent to which the active ingredient or active moiety in pharmaceutical
equivalents or pharmaceutical alternatives becomes available at the site of drug
action when administered at the same molar dose under similar conditions in an
appropriately designed study.” 21 C.F.R. § 320.1(e) (1994). When two compounds
act on the body with the same strength and similar bioavailability they are
bioequivalents. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(4th ed. 2000), available at http://www.dictionary.com/search?q=bioequivalent&r=67
(on file with the author). Thus, bioequivalent drug products are “pharmaceutical
equivalent or pharmaceutical alternative products that display comparable
bioavailability when studied under similar experimental conditions.” U.S. Food and
Drug Administration Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug
Administration Center for Drug Evaluation and Research Approved Drug Products with
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations Preface, available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/
docs/preface/ecpreface.htm (last visited February 12, 2002) (on file with the
author). Bioavailability is a measure of the compounds potential for entry into the
human receptor.
Danny D. Reible, Definition of Bioavailability, available at
http://www.hsrc.org/hsrc/html/ssw/bioavailability.pdf (on file with the author).
57
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of the approved drug, generic applicants are required only to submit
an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) that relies on the
64
FDA’s findings of safety and efficacy of the pioneer drug.
This
65
enables generic applicants to forego expensive clinical testing.
The generic applicant must provide a patent certification upon
submission of an ANDA certifying that (i) there are no patents on the
drug, (ii) the patent expired, (iii) the patent will expire prior to the
date on which the generic drug will be marketed, or (iv) the patent is
66
invalid or will not be infringed by the generic version.
The
applicant must submit this certification for each patent on the
67
pioneer drug that is listed in the Orange Book. Thus, under the
Act, generic companies may seek approval of patented drugs prior to
their patent expirations if one of the following conditions is met: 1)
they are certifying that the patent will expire prior to the sale of the
generic drug, 2) the patent is invalid, or 3) the patent will not be
68
infringed by generic manufacture. Submitting a generic application
for a drug claimed in a patent, however, is itself an act of patent
69
infringement.
70
Paragraph IV certification requests immediate FDA approval of
the ANDA prior to the expiration of a listed patent, and therefore,
71
constitutes infringement.
The generic company filing an ANDA
containing paragraph IV certification must notify the patent holder

64

21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(2)(A)(vii) (1994).
Id.
66
Id.
67
Brown, supra note 50, at 129-30.
68
21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (1994). The Hatch-Waxman Act not only allows a generic
company to file an ANDA prior to expiration of the pioneer drug patents, but it
encourages generic companies to challenge pioneer patents by providing a 180-day
exclusivity period to the first generic manufacturer. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)
(1994).
69
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (1994).
70
Paragraph IV certification provides that the pioneer drug “patent is invalid or
will not be infringed by generic manufacture, use or sale of the drug.” 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (1994).
71
Brown, supra note 50, at 130. “It shall be an act of infringement to submit an
application under . . . the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act . . . for a drug
claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent, . . . if the purpose of
such submission is to obtain approval under such Act to engage in the commercial
manufacture, use, or sale of a drug . . . claimed in a patent or the use of which is
claimed in a patent before the expiration of such patent.” 35 U.S.C.A. §
271(e)(2)(A) (West 1994); see also Yamanouchi v. Danbury, 231 F.3d 1339, 1346
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining that a generic company’s submission of an ANDA
constitutes an act of infringement when the purpose of the submission is to get
approval to market or manufacture the pioneer drug).
65
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72

of its request. The patent holder may bring an infringement suit
73
against the generic manufacturer based on the filing of the ANDA.
If the action is brought within a forty-five day period the HatchWaxman Act requires that the FDA halt approval of the ANDA until
the earlier of either the passage of thirty months or the successful
74
resolution of the patent infringement suit.
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides incentive for generic
companies to challenge a patent holder by awarding the first generic
manufacturer to submit an ANDA a 180-day exclusivity period
whereby it is protected from competition by subsequent generic
75
applicants.
This period begins either on the day the applicant
commercially markets the drug or on the day a decision of a court is
rendered holding the patent invalid or not infringed, whichever is
76
earlier.
Some brand-name pharmaceutical companies have manipulated
77
the Hatch-Waxman Act to delay generic production. Although the
Act requires NDA applicants to list in the Orange Book all patents for
an approved drug product that might be infringed upon by a generic
company marketing the drug, it provides no mechanism for
78
regulating the patents that are listed. When an ANDA applicant
files paragraph IV certification claiming a listed patent to be invalid, a
brand-name patent owner can automatically delay approval of the
ANDA for thirty months simply by instituting an infringement action
79
against the generic ANDA filer. Furthermore, the Hatch-Waxman
72

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (1994).
35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(2) (1994). A patent holder has an automatic cause of
action for infringement when a generic manufacturer certifies that a patent is invalid
or not infringed. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(ii) (1994).
74
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (1994). Under the GAAP, however, only the
alleged infringement of patents that are listed within thirty days of the time of
approval of the brand-name drug will trigger an automatic thirty-month stay of the
generic. S. Res. 812, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted). Brand-name companies will
have to obtain court ordered preliminary injunctions to delay generic approval of
any patents listed after the thirty-day period. Id.
75
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (1994). Under the GAAP, however, if a generic
and a brand-name company contract to keep the generic off the market, other
generic companies will not be prevented from bringing their generic versions to the
market. S. Res. 812, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted).
76
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I)-(II) (1994).
77
Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions For Pharmaceuticals: Have They
Outlived Their Usefulness? A Political, Legislative And Legal History of U.S. Law And
Observations For The Future, 39 J.L. & TECH. 389, 415 (1999).
78
Id. at 414-15. However, under the GAAP generic companies can seek the delisting of frivolous patents, but listings are not otherwise regulated. S. Res. 812, 107th
Cong. (2002) (enacted).
79
Engelberg, supra note 77, at 414-15.
73
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Act even allows for the NDA holder to receive this automatic thirtymonth stay of generic approval if they list a patent on the eve of
80
ANDA approval.
“Not surprisingly, the opportunity to extend
market exclusivity by merely listing a patent in the Orange Book . . .
encouraged brand-name drug companies to seek, obtain, and,
ultimately list a great variety of patents of little scope or merit except
81
for their ability to delay legitimate competition.”
The FDA approved nearly 900 new drug applications during the
82
1990s. Approximately one third of those were for new molecular
83
entities, while about one half were merely for new formulations or
84
new combinations of already approved active ingredients.
Moreover, most approved drug products have more than one
corresponding patent listed in the Orange Book and some have as
85
many as five or six listed patents.
These efforts by the pharmaceutical giants to use patents to stop
generic production are successful regardless of the ultimate outcome
86
because, each time an action is filed, the generic version is delayed.
80

Id.; see also Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 (2001)
(noting that merely twelve hours before Bristol-Myers Squibb’s patent on the
administration of buspirone to treat anxiety disorders was to expire, the PTO issued
Bristol-Myers Squibb a patent on the method of use of a metabolite produced by the
administration of buspirone which the FDA listed in the Orange Book). See generally
infra PART III. Under the GAAP brand-name pharmaceutical companies can only
receive an automatic thirty-month stay for patents listed within thirty days of approval
of the brand-name drug. S. Res. 812, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted). Any late listed
patents can only be used to delay generics by receiving a preliminary injunction from
a court. Id.
81
Engelberg, supra note 77, at 415.
82
See NIHCM Issue Brief, supra note 1.
83
New Molecular Entities are compounds never sold before in the US. Id.
84
Id.
85
Engelberg, supra note 77, at 415.
86
See The Federal Trade Commission, Prepared Statement Before the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation United States Senate, available at http://www.ftc.
gov/os/2002/04/pharmtestimony.htm#N_39_ (April 23, 2002) (on file with the
author). Under the Hatch-Waxman Act when a brand-name company brings an
infringement suit against a generic company, it is automatically granted a thirtymonth stay during which the generic is prohibited from going to market until the
infringement issue is resolved in the generic company’s favor. Id. However, if the
GAAP passes in the House and is signed into law by President Bush, then this
automatic thirty-month stay will only be available for patents listed in the Orange
Book within thirty days after approval of the brand-name drug. S. Res. 812, 107th
Cong. (2002) (enacted). Nevertheless, brand-name companies can still delay generic
production under the GAAP by alleging patent infringement for patents listed in the
Orange Book more than thirty days after the brand-name drug is approved by
obtaining a preliminary injunction. Id. Any delay in generic production is likely to
be profitable for the brand-name company. See Steve Seidenberg, The Battle Over
Drug Patents, 24 NAT’L. L.J. 43 (2002), available at http://www.nlj.com/special/
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Even if pioneer companies just delay generic production, as opposed
to keeping generics off the market by a finding of patent validity, they
have achieved a monopoly for that extended period.
II. OVERVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAW
Patents alone do not turn patentees into prohibited
87
monopolists. Nonetheless, patent holders are not immune from
88
antitrust liability. The improper exercise of patent rights can result
89
in antitrust violations.
A. Basis for an Antitrust Claim and Standing to Bring an Action
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization,
90
attempts to monopolize, and conspiracies to monopolize. To state a
claim for monopolizing under Section 2, a plaintiff must show “(1)
the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
91
business acumen, or historic accident.” The relevant market
92
includes both the product market and the geographic market. To
demonstrate attempted monopolization a plaintiff must show “(1)
that the defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive
conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous
071502patents.shtml (last visited Nov. 1, 2002)(on file with the author). For
instance, while Bristol-Myers Squibb delayed the generic sales of Buspirone through
the patent infringement suit, the company earned an estimated two million dollars a
day in sales. Id.
87
Abbot v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Professor Edmund
Kitch argues that it is a common misconception that patents lead to an economic
monopoly. Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1730 (2000). Kitch suggests that the
literature has often stated patents confer an economic monopoly on their owners,
but that this is only a true statement if the patent claims cover the entire relevant
market. Id.
88
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 7, at 1111.
89
Id. For instance, an antitrust violation can occur when a patentee knowingly
uses fraud to obtain a patent and subsequently brings a claim for infringement of the
fraudulently procured patent. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem.
Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965). Another example of when a patent holder may
violate antitrust laws is when the patentee brings an infringement suit that is a
“sham” to interfere with a competitor’s business. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference
v. Noerr Motor Freights, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961).
90
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2002).
91
United States v. Grinell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
92
Id. at 571. In patent cases the geographic market is nationwide. Id. The
determination of the product market depends on the ability of consumers to obtain
substitute products. Id.
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possibility of achieving monopoly power.”
Monopoly power is
94
defined as “the power to control prices or exclude competition.” A
95
majority market share may imply the existence of monopoly power.
96
Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act , private plaintiffs injured in
business by violation of antitrust laws have standing to bring an
97
antitrust action. The Federal Circuit approved the following criteria
to determine whether a claimant possesses antitrust standing:
(1) whether there is a causal connection between an antitrust
violationand harm to the plaintiff and the defendants intended to
cause that harm;(2) whether the nature of the plaintiff’s alleged
injury was of the typethe antitrust laws were intended to forestall;
(3) the directness or indirectness of the asserted injury; (4)
whether the claim rests on some abstract or speculative measure
of harm; and (5) the strong interest in keeping the scope of
complex antitrust trials within judicially manageable limits,
avoiding both duplicative recoveries and the complex
98
apportionment of damages.

Generic companies have succeeded in asserting these antitrust
99
violations. When the manufacturer of a generic form of Paclitaxel
filed an ANDA, Bristol-Myers Squibb, the brand-name
100
pharmaceutical company, brought suit for patent infringement.
The generic manufacturer then filed an antitrust action against
101
The United States District Court for the
Bristol-Myers Squibb.
District of New Jersey concluded that the generic manufacturer had
102
“standing to bring their Sherman Act claims.” The court found that
Bristol-Myers Squibb’s infringement litigation caused the generic
manufacturer’s injuries by preventing the generic manufacturer from
103
obtaining FDA approval of its generic paclitaxel.

93

Spectrum Sports, Inc., v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that the defendant patent holders were not liable for attempted
monopolization because there was no proof of a dangerous probability that
defendants would monopolize a particular market and no evidence of defendants’
specific intent to monopolize).
94
Grinnel, 384 U.S. at 571 (quoting United States v. Du Pont & Co., 351 U.S. 377,
391 (1956)).
95
Id.
96
15 U.S.C. §§ 12-19, 21-27; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (2002).
97
15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2002).
98
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., 90 F. Supp. 2d 540, 543 (2000).
99
Paclitaxel is a drug used to treat cancer. Id. at 541.
100
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 90 F. Supp. 2d at 546.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 544-45.
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B. Noerr-Pennington Immunity and the Exceptions
Even though a plaintiff may have standing to allege an antitrust
violation, a defendant may be protected from suit by the First
Amendment guarantees to the right to petition for legislative,
104
executive, administrative or judicial action.
Thus, where the
alleged anticompetitive conduct arises from the initiation of an
infringement action, a form of petitioning, the First Amendment and
105
antitrust laws collide.
The Supreme Court first articulated the
protection from antitrust liability for anticompetitive activity that
results from exercising the right to petition in Eastern Railroad
106
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., and United Mine
107
Workers v. Pennington.
The protection is known as Noerr108
Pennington immunity.
In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference, the Supreme Court
considered whether the Sherman Act applied to the railroads’ effort
109
The railroads were campaigning for state
to influence legislation.
110
laws for truck weight limits. The truckers alleged that the railroads
“had conspired to restrain trade in and monopolize the freight
111
business in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.” The Court
found that even if the railroads’ intent was to monopolize the market,
there was no violation of the Sherman Act because the action of
112
petitioning the government is lawful. The Court stated that to find
otherwise would deprive the public of the right to petition the
113
government for matters in which they are interested.
The Court
held that the Sherman Act is not applicable to activities that are
limited to soliciting the government because the right to petition the
114
government is a right granted by the Constitution.
Noting that
104

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Raymond Ku, Antittrust Immunity, The First Amendment and Settlements: Defining
the Boundaries of the Right to Petition, 33 IND. L. REV. 385, 385-86 (2000) (arguing that
the right to petition is not sufficient to justify antitrust immunity).
106
365 U.S. 127 (1961).
107
381 U.S. 657 (1965).
108
See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 365 U.S. 127; see also United Mine Workers,
381 U.S. 657.
109
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 365 U.S. at 129.
110
Id. at 131.
111
Id. at 129.
112
Id. at 139.
113
Id.
114
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 365 U.S. at 145. The Noerr-Pennington
doctrine was articulated in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
The First Amendment grants citizens the right to petition the government and the
105
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such political activity provides the government with valuable
information in a democratic society, the Court held that the Sherman
Act could not be used as a means for retaliatory antitrust lawsuits filed
115
in response to citizens petitioning the government.
The Court,
however, carved out an exception to antitrust immunity, stating that
application of the Sherman Act to a petitioning situation that is
merely an attempt to interfere with a competitor’s business would be
116
justified.
Four years later in United Mine Workers, the Supreme Court
extended antitrust immunity from petitioning the legislature to
117
lobbying the executive branch. Large coal miners and the United
Mine Workers persuaded the Secretary of Labor to raise the
minimum wage and convinced the Tennessee Valley Authority to
118
purchase coal only from miners paying the higher wage. The Court
stated, “[j]oint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the
antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition. Such
conduct is not illegal, either standing alone or as part of a broader
119
scheme violative of the Sherman Act.” Thus, even if the sole intent
is to eliminate competition, there is no Sherman Act violation
because the act of petitioning the executive branch is immunized.
Furthermore, in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking
120
Unlimited, the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act could not
121
California intrastate
be construed to limit access to the courts.
truckers tried to acquire operating rights while the interstate truckers
instituted state and federal procedures before the Interstate
122
Commerce Commission to prevent the acquisition of those rights.
Explaining that the right to petition extends to all three branches of
government, the Court extended the Noerr-Pennington immunity
doctrine to actions that involve petitioning the courts and
123
administrative agencies. The Court noted, however, the exception
carved out in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference making the doctrine

Sherman Act should not restrict this right. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 365 U.S.
at 137-38. However, there is an exception for sham petitioning. Id. at 144.
115
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 365 U.S. at 137-38.
116
Id. at 144.
117
Mine Workers, 381 U.S. at 657.
118
Id. at 660-61.
119
Id. at 670.
120
404 U.S. 508 (1972).
121
Id.
Noerr-Pennington immunity extends to petitioning activity before
administrative agencies and the courts. Id. at 510-11.
122
Id. at 509.
123
Id. at 510.
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inapplicable to litigation “that is a mere sham to cover what is actually
nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business
124
relationships of a competitor.”
The Court concluded that “illegal
and reprehensible practice which may corrupt the administrative or
judicial processes” would not fall “under the umbrella of ‘political
125
expression.’”
1. The Sham Litigation Exception
In Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures
126
Industries, Inc., the Supreme Court defined the sham exception to
127
To show that the lawsuit is a sham,
Noerr-Pennington immunity.
the antitrust plaintiff must demonstrate that the “lawsuit [is]
objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could
realistically expect success on the merits” and that the lawsuit was
initiated with bad faith to interfere directly with the business
128
relationships of a competitor. The Court stated that the economic
motivation behind bringing the suit was irrelevant because the suit
129
Thus, if it is shown that the suit is not
was objectively reasonable.
objectively baseless, the defendant’s motivation is immaterial even if
130
the motivation is to monopolize the market.
2. The Walker Process Fraud Exception
Another exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity exists when a
party knowingly and willfully makes fraudulent representations to the
131
government.
In Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery &
132
Chemical Corp.,
the issue was whether “maintenance and
enforcement of a patent obtained by fraud on the Patent Office may
133
be the basis of an action under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.” The
124

Id. at 511(quoting Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 365 U.S. at 144).
California Motor Transport, 404 U.S. at 513.
126
508 U.S. 49 (1993).
127
Id.
128
Id. at 60-61. Proof of sham litigation deprives the antirust defendant of NoerrPennington immunity. Id. at 61. The plaintiff still has the burden of establishing the
other elements of the antitrust claim. Id.
129
Id. at 65-66.
130
Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1072 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
131
Walker Process Equip., Inc., 382 U.S. at 174-78. The Supreme Court held that a
party that had engaged in alleged antitrust violations through a patent infringement
suit based on a patent obtained through fraud was not protected from antitrust
liability by Noerr-Pennington immunity. Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 173.
125
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Supreme Court stated that if it were proved that Food Machinery
obtained
their
patent
through
“knowing
and
willful
misrepresentations to the Patent Office,” they would be subject to
antitrust claims and the shield of Noerr-Pennington immunity would
134
not longer protect them. Conversely, evidence of Food Machinery’s
135
good faith would serve as a complete defense to the antitrust claim.
Thus, inappropriate use of patent rights can result in the
136
violation of antitrust laws.
Patent misuse occurs when a patent
holder leverages his patent to obtain greater market power than
137
intended by grant of the patent.
In Walker Process Equipment, Inc.,
the Supreme Court established that engaging in patent misuse and
138
Patent
obtaining a patent by fraud is a violation under Section 2.
misuse occurs when a patent holder brings a suit for the
139
infringement of a patent that was knowingly obtained fraudulently.
140
In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Laboratories, the District
Court of New Jersey stated that “antitrust liability under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act may arise when a patent has been procured by
knowing and willful fraud, the patentee has market power in the
relevant market, and has used its fraudulently obtained patent to
141
restrain competition.”
Thus, to state a claim for Walker Process
fraud, the generic company must show that the brand-name patentee
“1) knowingly and willfully made a fraudulent omission or
misrepresentation; 2) with clear intent to deceive the patent
examiner; [and] 3) the patent would not have issued but for the
142
misrepresentation or omission.”
143
In Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held “that whether conduct
in procuring or enforcing a patent is sufficient to strip a patentee of
134

Id. at 177.
Id.
136
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 7, at 1111.
137
RICHARD RAYSMAN ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING: FORMS AND
ANALYSIS § 6.03(4) (2001).
138
382 U.S. 172, 177-78 (1965). The Court held that a party, who monopolizes
the market through a patent infringement suit based on a patent that had been
obtained through fraudulent representations to the Patent Office, could violate § 2
of the Sherman Act if all the elements necessary to satisfy the statute were present.
Id. at 174-78.
139
Walker Process Equip., Inc., 382 U.S. at 177-78.
140
90 F. Supp. 2d 540 (D.N.J. 2000).
141
Id. at 542 (quoting C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1367 (Fed.
Cir. 1998)).
142
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 90 F. Supp. 2d at 542.
143
141 F.3d 1059 (1998).
135
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its immunity from the antitrust laws is to be decided as a question of
144
The court in Nobelpharma AB distinguished
Federal Circuit law.”
145
between inequitable conduct and Walker Process fraud. Walker Process
fraud requires a showing that there was a clear intent to deceive the
patent examiner, and without such misrepresentation, the patent
146
would not have issued.
Inequitable conduct, however, is lesser
misconduct that serves as a defense to a patent infringement claim
147
but does not expose the patent holder to antitrust liability.
“[W]alker Process antitrust liability is based on the knowing assertion of
a patent procured by fraud on the [Patent and Trademark Office
148
(PTO)]. [It is] very specific conduct that is clearly reprehensible.”
To prove Walker Process fraud there must be evidence of “a clear
intent to deceive the examiner and thereby cause the PTO to grant
149
an invalid patent.”
Thus, a patent holder can lose Noerr-Pennington immunity, and
150
be subject to antitrust liability in two ways.
First, if the patent was
procured through knowing and willful fraud, and if the patent
infringement plaintiff was aware of the fraud when bringing the suit,
151
the patent holder will be striped of immunity.
Second, “if the
patent infringement suit was a mere sham . . . namely that it was
objectively baseless and subjectively motivated by a desire to impose
collateral, anti-competitive injury rather than to obtain a justifiable
legal remedy” the patent infringement plaintiff will lose Noerr152
Pennington immunity.

III. PATENT PROSECUTION TACTICS USED TO EXTEND DRUG
MONOPOLIES
By 2005, patents will expire on brand-name prescription drugs

144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Id. at 1068.
Id. at 1069.
Id. at 1071.
Id. at 1070.
Id. at 1071.
Nobelpharma AB, 141 F.3d at 1070.
In re: Buspirone Antitrust Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d at 369.
Id.
Id.
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with combined U.S. sales of approximately $20 billion. In order to
protect these profits, brand-name pharmaceutical companies have
154
been using patent law to extend their monopolies.
For example,
companies have sought patents on the purified forms of drugs
obtained through manipulation of the compound’s molecular
155
structure. This strategy of obtaining additional patents on specific
features of a drug product, or a purified form of the drug, to extend
the monopoly on a drug when the original patent is close to
156
expiration is called “evergreening.”
“One [tactic] that has attracted increasing attention is the
development of ‘cleaned-up’ versions of old drugs, called single
157
isomers.” Often drugs exist in both active and inactive forms, and
the elimination of the inactive component may increase a drug’s
158
potency or reduce side effects.
With a new patent on the single
isomer form of a drug and large-scale advertising campaigns
promoting the advantages of the new version, brand-name companies
159
can lessen profit losses due to generic production of the old drug.
The FTC reviewed Eli-Lilly’s introduction of the single isomer version
160
of Prozac, Prozac Jr., without finding any antitrust violations.
Generic companies, consumers, and the media have accused
pharmaceutical companies of filing frivolous patents in order to
161
prolong litigation.
Under current drug-patent law, the FDA must
halt generic approval for thirty months when there is a patent
153

NIHCM Issue Brief, supra note 1.
Davis, supra note 6, at 357.
155
NIHCM Issue Brief, supra note 1.
156
Id.
157
David Pilling & Richard Wolffee, Drug Abuses: As Pharmaceutical companies go to
extraordinary lengths to protect expiring patents, regulators are starting to pay close attention,
FINANCIAL TIMES, April 20, 2000, available at http://globalarchive.ft.com/gl. .
./article.html?id=000420000245&query= pharmaceutical+patent (on file with the
author).
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id. Sepracore, a company that develops Improved Chemical Entities (ICE) to
help brand-name pharmaceutical companies battle generic manufactures, developed
a single isomer form of Prozac.
Brian Graney, Score One for Sepracore, at
http://www.fool.com/news/2000/sepr000413.htm (April 13, 2000) (on file with the
author). Prozac Jr., (R)–fluoxetine, is a single isomer form of Prozac that is more
effective and has less side effects. Id. Sepracore developed and patented (R)fluoxetine and licensed it to Eli Lily. Id. Instead of completely losing their market
share to generic manufacturers, Lily can use (R)-fluoxetine to segment the market.
Id. The FTC closed its investigation of Prozac Jr., finding that the introduction of the
ICE is not anticompetitive. Id.
161
Pilling & Wolffee, supra note 157. Some patents accused of being frivolous
have included patents on innovation in the shape or color of the pill. Id.
154
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162

dispute. Thus, a brand-name pharmaceutical company may obtain
a “frivolous” patent on some part of drug production, drug storage,
packaging, administration of the drug, or action in the body to delay
163
generic drug production and gain extensions on their monopolies.
A. Metabolite Patent
“A metabolite is a new molecule that is created after an existing
164
pharmaceutical agent breaks down in the body.”
Some
pharmaceutical companies have attempted to extend their patent
protection on certain brand-name drugs by patenting the metabolite
of the drug. However, in Hoechst-Roussel Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
165
Lehman, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded
166
that a patent on a drug’s metabolite does not claim the drug itself.
The claim of the patent defines the invention and thus the patent
167
owner’s property rights.
Merely claiming the drug’s metabolite, a
chemically distinct compound, does not claim the actual drug
168
Therefore, the patent for the drug’s metabolite is not
product.
necessarily a patent for the actual drug.
In a remarkable attempt to delay generic production, BristolMyers Squibb received a patent on the metabolite produced by the
breakdown of their anti-anxiety drug, BuSpar®, one day before the
169
patent on the active ingredient expired. Under the current Hatch-

162

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (1994).
Robert Langreth & Victoria Murphy, Perennial Patents, FORBES, Apr. 2, 2001,
available at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2001/0402/052_print.html (on file with
the author). For example, Pfizer obtained a new patent on Neurontin, a popular
epilepsy drug, whose patent expired in 2000. Id. The new patent is for “a way to
formulate the drug to prevent degradation.” Id. While courts determine the validity
of the new patent, analysts estimate Pfizer will gain another $1.5 billion in Neurontin
sales. Id.
164
Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 n.6 (2001).
165
109 F.3d 756 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
166
See id. Hoechst’s patent claimed “1-hydroxy-tacrine and a method of treating
patients in need of memory enhancement.” Id. at 757. 1-hydroxy-tacrine is the
metabolite formed by the break down of tacrine hydrocholoride. Id. The patent did
not, however, claim tacrine hydrochloride, the active ingredient in a drug used to
treat Alzheimer’s disease. Id. The court noted that Hoechst might be entitled to
exclude others from administering tacrine hydrocholoride to patients because
tacrine hydrochloride is metabolized into 1-hydroxy-tacrine in the body. Id. at 759.
See Zenith Labs v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 19 F.3d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(indicating that patent infringement may arise if the administered drug is
metabolized in vivo into the patented product).
167
Hoechst-Roussel Pharm., Inc., 109 F.3d at 759.
168
See id.
169
Langreth & Murphy, supra note 163.
163
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170

Waxman scheme, FDA approval of the generic production of
BuSpar® was put on hold until it could be determined whether the
patent was valid and whether generic production would produce the
171
metabolite. Bristol-Myers Squibb argued that ingestion of a generic
172
would produce the metabolite.
173
the active
Bristol-Myers Squibb first patented buspirone,
174
ingredient in BuSpar® for the treatment of anxiety in 1980.
Because FDA approval was not granted until 1986, Bristol-Myers
Squibb received a two-year patent term extension, and thus, their
175
patent was set to expire in 2000.
Mylan Pharmaceuticals (Mylan)
submitted an ANDA to market a generic buspirone under paragraph
176
III certification, stating that it would not market the generic until
177
Bristol-Myers Squibb’s patent expired. It was “tentatively approved”
178
with final approval contingent on expiration of the patent. BristolMyers Squibb, however, obtained another patent on BuSpar® on the
179
last day of the patent term. Due to the new patent, Mylan could not
180
Bristolreceive final approval to market its generic buspirone.
Myers Squibb indicated to the FDA that the new patent was “a
181
method of use patent.”
Mylan argued that the patent was improperly listed in the
Orange Book because the patent did not ‘“claim the drug’ or a
‘method of using’ the drug for which Bristol had obtained FDA
approval,” and that the patent did not meet the requirement that “a
claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person
not licensed by the owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of
170

If the GAAP was enacted into law Bristol-Myers Squibb would not receive an
automatic thirty month stay for its late listed patent, but would have to seek a court
ordered preliminary injunction to halt distribution of the generic. S. Res. 812, 107th
Cong. (2002) (enacted).
171
Mylan Pharm, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 9.
172
Id.
173
Buspirone is the active ingredient of Bristol-Myers Squibb’s brand-name drug
BuSpar®, a medication used to treat generalized anxiety disorder. Id. at 7.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 7-8.
176
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act generic applicants must certify that they are not
infringing any patents by submitting an ANDA. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A)(iii)
(1994). Under paragraph III certification, the generic ANDA applicant states that
the patent(s) listed for the pioneer drug will expire on a specific date. Id.
177
Mylan Pharm., Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 8-9.
178
Id. at 9.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id. In a press release Bristol-Myers Squibb stated, “the [new] patent covers ‘a
method of use of a metabolite produced by the administration of buspirone.’” Id.

500

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33:479

182

the drug.”
Subsequently, the court enjoined Bristol-Myers Squibb
to request that the FDA de-list the metabolite patent from the Orange
Book, and the FDA was ordered to approve Mylan’s ANDA for the
183
generic BuSpar®.
In response to Bristol-Myers Squibb’s action, Mylan and various
other generic drug makers and purchasers of buspirone brought suit
against Bristol-Myers Squibb claiming anticompetitive conduct
184
related to the use and sale of buspirone.
In the consolidated
multidistrict litigation, Bristol-Myers Squibb moved to dismiss all of
185
the antitrust claims. Bristol-Myers Squibb argued that its actions in
listing of the buspirone metabolite patent in the Orange Book and
bringing the subsequent patent infringement suits against the
generic manufacturers of buspirone were protected from Sherman
186
Act claims under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The court found
that Noerr-Pennington immunity did not apply to the listing of the
buspirone patent in the Orange Book because it is not an act of
187
petitioning the government.
Because the FDA is required to
publish submitted patent information, and thus the “FDA’s actions
are non-discretionary and do not reflect any decision as to the validity
of the representations in an Orange Book listing” the court
188
concluded that the act does not constitute petitioning.
The court
further stated that Bristol-Myers Squibb’s patent infringement actions
may fall under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, but noted that even if
Noerr-Pennington immunity did apply, the plaintiffs’ facts were
sufficient to establish the Walker Process fraud and “sham” litigation
189
exceptions to immunity.
The court noted, “neither the Supreme
182

Mylan Pharm, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 19 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(1),
(c)(2)).
183
Id. at 29.
184
In re: Buspirone Antitrust Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363, 365-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
185
Id. at 367.
186
Id. at 367-68.
187
Id. at 369-70.
188
Id. at 371.
189
Id. at 373. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturer defrauded
the FDA by submitting the patent to the FDA claiming it covered approved uses of
buspirone knowing the statements were false. In re: Buspirone Antitrust Litig., 185 F.
Supp. 2d, at 373. Bristol-Myers Squibb indicated to the FDA that their patent does
not just claim the metabolite, but also claims a method of use for buspirone. Mylan
Pharm., Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 10. There was no objective basis for Bristol-Myers
Squibb to claim their metabolite patent claimed the use of buspirone because it
would have been invalid if it did. Id. at 9. In a separate companion opinion granting
summary judgment in favor of the generic manufacturers on patent infringement
claims brought against them by Bristol-Myers Squibb, the court found that the
metabolite patent does not claim buspirone, and if it did it would be invalid under 35
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Court nor the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has addressed
whether the Walker Process exception would apply to a fraudulent
listing of a patent in the Orange Book along with subsequent lawsuits
190
seeking to exploit the listing for anticompetitive advantage.”
The
Court, however, “accept[ing] the material facts alleged in the
complaint as true and constru[ing] all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiffs’ favor,” denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on
191
Noerr-Pennington immunity.
The court found that the plaintiffs
pled sufficient facts that, if proven, would establish Walker Process
fraud, and that there was no objective basis for Bristol-Myers Squibb’s
claim that the metabolite patent claimed buspirone, thus stripping
192
Bristol-Myers Squibb of immunity.
In an analogous case, Astrazeneca, another pharmaceutical
innovator company, sued generic companies for patent infringement
for filing ANDAs seeking approval to market generic versions of
193
Astrazeneca’s gastric acid inhibitor, Prilosec.
The court granted
194
The court
summary judgment to the generic manufacturers.
concluded that administration of the generic does not infringe the
patent on the metabolite even though its active ingredient is
195
converted into the metabolite in the body.
Astrazeneca’s patent that covered the active ingredient of
196
Prilosec, omeprazole, expired in October 2001.
Astrazeneca,
however, also holds a patent on “sulphenamides and the
administration of sulphenamides for the treatment of inflammatory
diseases of the human gastrointestinal tract” that will not expire until
197
Astrazeneca claimed that ingestion of the generic
May 2005.
U.S.C. section 102(b) for violating the on sale bar. In re: Buspirone Patent Litigation,
185 F. Supp. 2d 340, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The on-sale bar renders unpatentable
inventions ‘“patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign
country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the
date of the application for patent in the United States.”‘ Id. at 359 (quoting 35
U.S.C. § 102(b)). It is undisputed that buspirone has been sold commercially in the
United States since 1986 as BuSpar®. Id. at 57. Further, Bristol-Myers Squibb even
admitted to the PTO that its metabolite patent did not cover Buspirone. Mylan
Pharm., Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 9.
190
In re: Buspirone Antitrust Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d at 373.
191
Id. (quoting Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 69 F.3d 669, 673 (2d Cir. 1995).
192
Id. at 373.
193
In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., No. 1291, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7103, 1
(S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2001).
194
Id. at 38.
195
Id. at 37.
196
Id. at 3-4.
197
Id. at 4. Sulphenamides are a class of chemical compounds that are used to
treat inflammatory diseases of the gastrointestinal tract. In re Omeprazole Patent Litig.,
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manufacturer’s omeprazole would infringe their sulphenamide
patent because ingestion of omeprazole causes sulphenamide
198
production in the body. The court found that “by claiming patent
protection for sulphenamides formed in vivo after the oral
administration of omeprazole, [Astrazeneca] has merely attempted to
patent the unpatentable, ‘a scientific explanation for the prior art’s
199
The court held that the defendants, generic
functioning.’”
manufacturers, did not infringe Astrazeneca’s patent on
sulphenamide “because any claim to sulphenamides produced in vivo
upon the oral administration of omeprazole is inherently anticipated
200
by prior art.”
Existing case law has established that a metabolite patent does
not claim the precursor drug from which the metabolite is formed
201
when administered. If brand-name companies list these metabolite
patents in the Orange Book and subsequently institute patent
infringement actions against generic ANDA filers, the NoerrPenington doctrine may still shield brand-name companies from
antitrust liability unless generics can prove that either the Walker
Process fraud or “sham” litigation exception applies. However,
202
following the holding of In re: Buspirone Antitrust Litigation, it
appears that generic companies may be able to meet the difficult
standards of proving Walker Process fraud or “sham” litigation when
brand-name pharmaceutical companies rely on metabolite patents to
assert that generic manufacturers are infringing their brand-name
drug patents.
B. Double Patenting
Another way that pharmaceutical companies have been able to
extend a patent term is through obviousness-type double patenting.
Although double patenting is prohibited, if a pharmaceutical
company is successful in obtaining a double patent it can extend its
203
monopoly at least until the patent is found invalid. In some cases,
delay of a generic for only a few months may result in millions more
No. 1291, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 4.
198
Id.
199
In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., No. 1291, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 36 (quoting
Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1347 (1999)). In vivo means in the
body, thus when sulphenamides are formed in vivo they are formed upon the
ingestion of omeprazole.
200
Id. at 37-38.
201
Hoechst-Roussel Pharm., Inc., 109 F.3d at 759.
202
185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
203
Seidenberg, supra note 86.
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204

dollars worth of profits to a company.
The obvious-type double patenting doctrine is a court-made
prohibition of patent-term extension through subsequent patent
205
claims that are not distinct from claims in a prior patent. The court
first analyzes the claims in both patents for differences, and then
206
determines if the differences are patentably distinct. A subsequent
claim that “is obvious over, or anticipated by, the earlier claim, is not
patentably distinct and thus invalid for obvious-type double
207
patenting.”
Barr Laboratories (“Barr”) filed an ANDA with paragraph IV
certification for fluoxetine hydrochloride, the active ingredient in Eli
208
Lilly & Co.’s (“Lilly”) antidepressant drug Prozac.
Lilly brought a
subsequent infringement action alleging that Barr infringed Lilly’s
209
patents for the drug. Barr argued that Lilly’s second patent, which
would have extended its monopoly for three extra years, was invalid
210
for double patenting. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
agreed and held that the patent was invalid for obviousness-type
211
double patenting.
The earlier Lilly patent claimed “a method for treating anxiety
in a human by administering an effective amount of fluoxetine or a
pharmaceutically-acceptable salt thereof,” and the second patent
claimed “a method of blocking the uptake of serotonin by brain
neurons in animals by administering the compound fluoxetine
212
hydrochloride.”
The court found that people ordinary skilled in
the art know “that fluoxetine hydrochloride is a pharmaceutically213
acceptable salt of fluoxetine.”
Furthermore, all evidence
demonstrated that “blocking serotonin uptake by use of fluoxetine
hydrochloride is an inherent characteristic of the administration of
fluoxetine hydrochloride for any purpose, including the treatment of
204

When Bristol-Myers Squibb was able to delay the generic version of BuSpar® in
only several months they earned $200 million in profits on the sale of the brand
name drug. Bitter Medicine, supra note 10.
205
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 967 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
206
Id. at 968.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 958. Under paragraph IV certification the generic manufacturer certifies
that it is not infringing the pioneer drug’s patent(s) because the patent(s) is invalid
or will not be infringed by generic manufacture, use, or sale of the pioneer drug. 21
U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A)(iv) (1994).
209
Eli Lilly & Co., 251 F.3d at 958.
210
Id.
211
Id. at 958-59.
212
Id. at 968-69.
213
Id. at 969.
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214

anxiety.” Because the second patent described the method through
which fluoxetine hydrochloride worked, it was not patentably distinct
215
from the prior patent.
216
(“SmithKline”)
In March of 2000, SmithKline Beecham
obtained an additional patent on Augmentin®, U.S. Patent Nos.
6,218,380 (the “380 patent”), potentially extending its monopoly on
217
the antibiotic until 2017. SmithKline holds the patent on the active
218
ingredient, amoxycilin.
The newly granted U.S. patent covers
additional features of the drug such as an acid that inhibits
219
Teva Pharmaceuticals, a
degradation of the active ingredient.
generic drug manufacturer, sought summary judgment alleging that
its proposed generic would not infringe SmithKline’s 380 patent
because the patent is invalid on the grounds of obviousness-type
220
double patenting. The court found that the 380 patent appears to
be a rewording of the previous patent, U.S. Patent Number 4,529,720
(the “720 patent”), and thus, the two patents are not patentably
221
distinct.
Therefore, the court invalidated the 380 patent for
222
obvious type double patenting.
Although a finding of obvious-type double patenting will render
invalid a patent that is not patentably distinct from an earlier patent,
a brand-name company that succeeds in obtaining a double patent
will have extended its monopoly under the current Hatch-Waxman
scheme by halting FDA approval of a generic ANDA until the patent
223
is found to be invalid.
If brand-name companies list these double
patents in the Orange Book and subsequently institute patent
infringement actions against generic ANDA filers, the NoerrPennington doctrine may shield the brand-name companies from
antitrust liability unless the generics can succeed at proving Walker
224
Process fraud or “sham” litigation.

214

Id. at 970.
Eli Lilly & Co., 251 F.3d at 971.
216
SmithKline Beecham Corporation is now GlaxoSmithKline.
217
Pilling and Wolffee, supra note 157.
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
Geneva Pharm., Inc. v. Glaxosmithkline PLC, 189 F. Supp. 2d 377, 379-81
(E.D.Va. 2002).
221
Id. at 384-85.
222
Id.
223
Seidenberg, supra note 86.
224
Id.
215
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C. Polymorph Patent
Pharmaceutical compounds may crystallize in different forms
225
called polymorphic forms.
Some pharmaceutical companies have
attempted to extend their patent protection on certain drugs by
226
patenting the polymorphs of those drugs.
Glaxo alleged that generic production of Zantac®, an anti-ulcer
medication by Novopharm, would infringe its patents on ranitidine
227
hydrochloride, the active ingredient in Zantac®.
Glaxo has three
patents on ranitidine hydrochloride, which crystallizes into two
228
The patent that “discloses a method of making
distinct forms.
ranitidine hydrochloride and claims the compound per se” expired
229
in July 1997.
Glaxo scientists later discovered that ranitidine
hydrochloride crystallizes into a form preferable to the first known
230
crystalline form, which was referred to as Form 1. They called the
231
new form Form 2. Form 2 and the process for making Form 2 were
patented in two separate patents that would expire in 2002 and 2004,
232
respectively. Novopharm filed an ANDA in 1991 seeking to market
233
Glaxo brought suit against Novopharm for infringement
Form 2.
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2), but Novopharm challenged the validity
of the Form 2 patent. Novopharm alleged the original patent
disclosed the method of making ranitidine hydrochloride and
234
claimed the compound anticipated the Form 2 patent’s claims.
The district court, however, rejected Novopharm’s “anticipation
235
defense.”
In 1994, Novopharm filed another ANDA to market Form 1
certifying that it would not infringe the Form 2 patent, and it did not
236
Glaxo
intend to market Form 1 until the Glaxo patent expired.
sued Novopharm for infringement of its patent on the process of
225

Allen G. Mitchell, Racemic Drugs: Racemic Mixture, Racemic Compound, or
Pseudoracemate?, J. PHARMACY & PHARM. SCI., available at http://www.ualberta.ca/~csps
/JPPS1(1)/A.Mitchell/racemicview.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2002) (on file with the
author). Polymorphism is defined as the ability of a compound to crystallize in
multiple forms. Id.
226
See Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562 (1997).
227
Id. at 1563-64.
228
Id. at 1564.
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Glaxo, Inc., 110 F.3d at 1564.
233
Id.
234
Id.
235
Id.
236
Id.
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237

making Form 2.
Novopharm’s ANDA permitted the product “to
have a Form 1 [ranitidine hydrochloride] purity as low as 90%” with
238
impurities that may include Form 2.
Glaxo, however, was not able to establish that Novopharm’s
239
Form 1 ranitidine hydrochloride generic would contain Form 2.
Thus, the court found that “Glaxo failed to prove that Novopharm’s
product would contain Form 2 ranitidine hydrochloride . . . [and]
also failed to prove that Novopharm was using a process claimed in
240
the [Form 2 process] patent.”
Nonetheless, it appears that patenting different polymorphic
forms of patented drugs may be a legitimate way for brand-name
241
companies to extend their monopolies.
If brand-name companies
can establish that generic manufacturers are producing drugs that
contain the patented polymorphs they can prohibit generics from
producing these drugs because doing so would constitute
242
infringement.
A generic manufacturer, however, may produce a
generic version of a drug in a polymorphic form for which the patent
243
has expired.
IV. ANALYSIS
Patent “evergreening” is a popular practice among brand-name
pharmaceutical companies. Still, the unclear distinction between
brand-name companies’ aggressive, pro-active behavior and anticompetitive behavior can lead to antitrust challenges by generic
244
companies and the federal government.
Generic pharmaceutical companies sued for patent
infringement for filing ANDAs will likely have standing to bring
claims against their brand-name challengers under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act. Generic manufacturers can assert that the brand-name
companies violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by monopolizing or
245
attempting to monopolize the market for their brand-name drugs.
Generics can allege that the brand-name companies achieved
237

Id.
Glaxo, Inc., 110 F.3d at 1564.
239
Id. at 1571.
240
Id.
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id.
244
Peter O. Safir, Current Issues in the Pioneer Versus Generic Drug Wars, 50 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 335, 335 (1995), available at http://www.fdii.org/pubs (on file with the
author).
245
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 90 F. Supp. 2d at 542.
238
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monopoly power in the market for their drugs because of their
246
predominant market share. Generics can also assert that the brandname companies violated Section 2 by willfully seeking to maintain
247
their monopoly power.
Under the Noerr-Pennington immunity doctrine, however,
brand-name pharmaceutical companies are likely to be immune from
Sherman Act Section 2 claims for bringing patent infringement suits
against generic companies who file ANDAs. Patents are presumed
248
valid for the duration of the lawsuit until invalidated by the court.
Therefore, brand-name companies are operating within the rights
granted to them through grant of the patent. Under the patent
grant, brand-name companies have the right to exclude generics
249
from producing and selling their patented drugs.
Because the
brand-name companies have patent protection, the lawsuits alleging
patent infringement are unlikely to be found to be objectively
baseless and thus, generics will not be able to successfully allege the
“sham” litigation exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity.
Generic companies can allege that brand-name companies have
committed Walker Process fraud by using fraud to procure their
patents. Nevertheless, generic companies will face challenges in
showing that the brand-name patentee “1) . . . knowingly and willfully
made a fraudulent omission or misrepresentation; 2) with clear
intent to deceive the patent examiner; 3) where the . . . ‘patent
250
would not have issued but for the misrepresentation or omission.’”
It is clear that brand-name companies have used the clause in
the Hatch-Waxman Act requiring the FDA to freeze approval of a
generic ANDA for thirty months or until the patent infringement suit
is resolved in court to delay generic production and extend their
251
monopolies on money-making drugs.
The Greater Access to
Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act (“GAAP”) purports to close this
loophole in the Hatch-Waxman Act by removing the thirty-month
statutory preliminary injunction for any drug patent listed in the
Orange Book more than thirty days after approval of the brand-name

246

See Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. at 571.
Id. at 570-71.
248
35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988).
249
Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378 (1945). The patent gives its owner
a monopoly on the invention that expires twenty years from the date of the patent
application. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994).
250
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 90 F. Supp. 2d at 542 (quoting Nobelpharma AB v.
Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
251
Engelberg, supra note 77, at 415.
247
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drug.
The GAAP was passed in the Senate on July 31, 2002.
Under the GAAP, in the case of late listed patents, brand-name
companies can seek a court-granted preliminary injunction
prohibiting the applicant from engaging in the commercial
manufacture or sale of the drug until the court decides the issues of
254
patent validity and infringement.
Elimination of the thirty-month injunction, however, is not likely
to be enough to halt any anti-competitive behavior. A presumption
of validity is given to patents and the burden is on the challenger of
the patent to show that a patent is invalid by clear and convincing
255
evidence.
Furthermore, courts grant preliminary injunctions
against alleged patent infringers when (1) it is reasonably likely that
the patent holder will be successful on the merits, (2) there is a
possibility of irreparable harm, (3) the balancing of hardships faced
by the parties weighs in the patent holders favor, and (4) the
injunction will not likely have an adverse impact on the public
256
interest. Further, “it is often assumed that infringement of a valid
257
patent would result in irreparable harm.”
Thus, it is likely that
removal of the thirty-month statutory injunction will not remedy the
existing situation because brand-name pharmaceutical companies
can still delay generic production with the grant of a preliminary
injunction by merely making a showing to the court that the patent
could be valid.
The Federal Circuit gives great weight to patent holders. Patents
are presumed valid and patent invalidity can only be demonstrated
258
with clear and convincing evidence. The patent process, however,
is ex parte; the company seeking the patent provides the
259
information.
Also, patent examiners do not spend a lot of time
reviewing applications and prior art, and often miss relevant prior
260
The Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) approves
art.
approximately seventy-percent of the massive amount of patent

252

S. Res. 812, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted).
Id.
254
Id.
255
Engelberg, supra note 77, at 422; see also Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601
F.2d 986, 996 (9th Cir. 1979).
256
Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Grip-Pak, Inc., 906 F.2d 679, 681 (Fed. Cir. 1990);
see also Engelberg, supra note 77, at 422.
257
Engelberg, supra note 77, at 422.
258
Lemley, supra note 40, at 1528.
259
Langenfeld, supra note 12, at 106.
260
Lemley, supra note 40.
253
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261

applications it reviews.
The PTO should revise its procedures so
that close scrutiny is given to all patent applications. The PTO
should also take competition into account when reviewing
applications and frivolous applications should be denied.
In
addition, a more careful analysis should be given to the review of any
application and all relevant prior art when an applicant seeks to
obtain an additional patent on a pharmaceutical product that would
extend the initial patent holders’ monopoly beyond the expiration of
the original patent. Therefore, PTO procedures should be reviewed
in an attempt to increase competition and deter pharmaceutical
companies from engaging in anti-competitive behavior by
manipulating intellectual property rights.
In addition, the Orange Book alone provides an opportunity for
262
a brand-name drug patent holder to extend its market exclusivity.
There are no guidelines for listing patents in the Orange Book and
263
no mechanism for removing them.
Thus, the Orange Book itself
encourages brand-name pharmaceutical companies to procure
frivolous patents. Guidelines for regulating listings in the Orange
Book should be established to prevent the listing of frivolous
264
patents. Such guidelines should provide specifically for any listing
that extends a brand-name pharmaceutical company’s monopoly
beyond the expiration of the initial patent to be scrutinized.
Furthermore, any new legislation should impose a meaningful
penalty upon companies that are found to have deliberately
forestalled generic production by filing frivolous patents. Under the
current scheme even if a frivolous patent is subsequently found
invalid, the patent holder will have successfully forestalled generic
production, at least until the infringement suit is determined. With
some blockbuster drugs generating approximately $1,100,000 per day
265
per drug, the present system provides a mechanism for anticompetitive behavior where economic incentive clearly exists.
CONCLUSION
Patients’ rights groups argue that these extensions of drug
261

Langenfeld, supra note 12, at 108.
See discussion infra PART I.
263
Engelberg, supra note 77, at 414-15.
264
If enacted into law, the GAAP will provide generic companies with the ability
to challenge these listings and seek de-listing of inappropriately listed patents. S.
Res. 812, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted).
265
Terry G. Mahn, Symposium Issue - Striking The Right Balance Between Innovation
And Drug Price Competition: Understanding The Hatch-Waxman Act: The Hatch-Waxman
Act During Patent Prosecution and Beyond, 54 FOOD DRUG L.J. 233 (1999).
262
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patents hurt consumers and the health care system by creating
monopolies. Pharmaceutical companies, however, are using the
current United States patent laws to obtain these patents. Further,
patent law is designed to promote scientific research and innovation
and these patents are being used to develop innovative prescription
drugs that will ultimately benefit patients. Although both sides have
strong policy arguments, it appears that the current scheme favors
brand-name pharmaceutical companies by allowing them to use
loopholes in the laws to extend their patent terms, while protecting
them from antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.

